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Irrationality in English Auctions
Ricardo Gonçalvesy
Universidade Católica Portuguesa (Porto) and Universidade de Aveiro
September 2006
Abstract
This paper explores the e¤ects of a particular form of irrational behaviour by participating
bidders in a common value English auction. We allow bidders to update their expected val-
uation of the good as the current price increases, assuming that their opponents always play
the symmetric Nash equilibrium. When only one bidder adopts this type of behaviour, it is
ambiguous whether the nal auction price is higher or lower than at the symmetric equilibrium.
However, when both bidders behave irrationally, the nal auction price is never lower than the
symmetric equilibrium provided bidders matchtheir strategies.
JEL Classication: D44
Keywords: English auctions, irrationality, asymmetric equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Thus far, models of common value1 English auctions have focused almost exclusively on rational
bidders leading to Nash equilibria: each bidder plays the best response to his opponents strategy
and makes a positive ex post prot in equilibrium. Milgrom and Webers (1982) important paper
has focused on the symmetric equilibrium of this type of auction, whereas Bikhchandani and Riley
(1991), following Milgroms (1981) seminal results, have focused on the many asymmetric equilibria.
Those theoretical results are questioned by a number of experimental studies2. For example, Avery
and Kagel (1997) nd that in a signicant percentage of English auctions (around 30%) the winning
bidder loses money because all bidders use aggressive and non-Nash equilibrium bidding strategies3.
A common feature in experimental studies of English auctions is the nature of the alternative
bidding rule (apparently) used by bidders. Levin et al. (1996) demonstrate that the bidding
strategy that is best at explaining the data is a signal averaging rule, in essence a weighted average
between a bidders own signal and the last drop out price. Although this signal averaging rule
yields (theoretically) the same average price as the Nash equilibrium strategy, it is not a Nash
equilibrium. Furthermore, in their experiments, Levin et al. nd that most auctions4 were a¤ected
by overbidding: nal auction prices were signicantly higher than predicted by symmetric Nash
equilibrium bidding and ex post prots were consequently lower.
Avery and Kagel conclude that the bidding strategy with more predictive power is also a
statisticalbidding rule5: a bidder appears to combine his own signal and the expected value of
his opponents signal, using the commonly known prior signal distribution. Again, such a bidding
rule is not a Nash equilibrium. Bidders with signal realisations below the average of the prior
distribution will overbid (compared to the Nash prediction), whereas bidders with signals above
the average will underbid. Additionally, under that rule, the winning bidder will fall prey to the
winners curse and lose money with positive probability6.
The experimental results in Gonçalves and Hey (2007) also suggest a statisticalbidding rule
as the most likely bidding function: bidders combine their own signal and the expected value of their
opponents signal using the prior signal distribution given the signal ranking, which was common
knowledge before the start of each auction. This rule is equivalent to Avery and Kagels bidding
1As well as private values.
2See Kagel (1995) for an overview of the experimental literature.
3This does not depend on biddersexperience; the percentage of auctions yielding negative prots for the winner
is not signicantly reduced as each bidder gains experience by participating in more auctions.
4With the exception of auctions with superexperienced bidders.
5That they dene as expected value bidding.
6The probability that both bidders have a signal realization below the distribution average and overbid compared
to the Nash equilibrium prediction is 0.25 (Avery and Kagel assume the independent uniform distribution).
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rule once account is taken of the additional information bidders had: the knowledge of the signal
ranking. And this rule is also not a Nash equilibrium. As in Avery and Kagel, Gonçalves and Hey
nd systematic overbidding compared to the symmetric Nash equilibrium that results in lower ex
post prots7.
A common aspect of these alternative bidding rules is that they induce overbidding and the
winners curse: if all bidders adhered to those rules, nal average prices would be at least as high as
predicted by (symmetric) Nash bidding. Those rules also generate negative prots for the winner in
a signicant number of auctions. This paper proposes an English auction model (with two bidders)
that attempts to explain these facts. In particular, the model incorporates the main feature of those
alternative bidding rules: we assume that bidders may choose a bidding strategy based on their
own signal and the expected value of their opponents signal, which they will try to infer as the
auction price increases. However, we also assume that bidders behaving in this way will incorrectly
believe that their opponent will always play the symmetric Nash bidding strategy. These are the
two main characteristics of what we consider to be an irrationalbidder. We show that if a bidder
is irrational, his bidding strategy is more aggressive than the symmetric Nash bidding function.
We study two possibilities. First, we allow only one bidder to behave irrationally. From
the auctioneers point of view, and with no further assumptions, the expected auction price may
be higher or lower than the symmetric equilibrium depending on who holds the highest signal.
However, and as a special case, we show that if the signal distribution is highly a¢ liated, the
auctioneers revenues are maximised at the symmetric equilibrium, a result that is similar in nature
to those obtained by Bikhchandani and Riley (1991) and Avery (1998).
Second, we allow both bidders to behave irrationally. In this case, there may exist multiple
equilibria, including a mixed strategy equilibrium where both bidders bid aggressively with positive
probability. This mixed strategy is an equilibrium because each bidder benets from playing ag-
gressively (an expected auction price lower than at the symmetric equilibrium) but faces a cost: the
expected loss associated with the the probability that their opponent is playing aggressively as well
(which implies an expected auction price higher than at the symmetric equilibrium). Depending
on the probability distribution of the signals, other equilibria may exist, including pure strategy
symmetric and asymmetric equilibria.
Our results show that the auctioneer receives a higher expected price than at the symmetric
equilibrium provided both bidders play symmetrically (i.e. provided bidders matchtheir strate-
gies). Bikhchandani and Riley argue that it may be reasonable for symmetric bidders to behave
symmetrically in one period games and therefore we would expect the auctioneer to benet from
7 In Gonçalves and Hey, 19% of all auctions resulted in negative prots for the winner, but the average prot
earned by bidders was positive (although lower than under Nash bidding).
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biddersirrationality in single period auctions.
In a related paper, Eyster and Rabin (2005) propose the concept of cursed equilibrium, where
a player in a Bayesian game believes with probability  that his opponents do not act in accordance
with the private information they have (i.e. they do not act rationally). If  = 0; then all players
are perfectly rational and the relevant equilibrium concept is that of Bayesian Nash equilibrum;
however, if  > 0 then all players believe with positive probability that they are playing against
not-fully rational players, and the relevant equilibrium concept is that of an -cursed equilibrium.
In the context of common value English auctions, Eyster and Rabin show that seller revenue is
increasing with  and that if a su¢ cient number of bidders participate in the auction, the winner
incurs the winners curse and loses money. Our results partly corroborate these ndings, but in our
setup bidders may not only be cursedbut may also choose how cursed they want to be (the
probability of behaving irrationally). If both bidders behave irrationally with positive probability,
they will overbid compared to the Nash equilibrium prediction and increase sellers revenue. They
do not, however, expect to lose money.
The background of the model is presented in the next section, together with previous theoretical
results. Section 3 analyses the case with only one irrational bidder and section 4 the case with two
irrational bidders. Section 5 concludes. An appendix to the paper (available on the JEBO website)
contains an illustrative example.
2 The English auction model
2.1 Denitions
We focus on a common value English auction where two symmetric risk neutral bidders compete for
the purchase of one single indivisible good. We adopt the Japanese variant of the English auction
used by Milgrom and Weber, where the price increases continuously and interested bidders must
depress a button as long as th y are interested in the good. When all but one bidder release the
button, the auction nishes. The price, the number of bidders and the drop-out prices of all bidders
are displayed for all to see. A strategy for a given bidder in this auction game, as explained by
Milgrom and Weber, must specify, for any price level, whether he should remain active or quit given
all the information available. In a model with only two bidders, such a strategy entails selecting a
single number: the price at which that bidder will release the button and let his opponent win.
We assume the auctioneer has a reservation price of 0: The common value of this good, V; is
ex ante unknown to both bidders. However, each bidder receives a signal xi 2 [0; x] ; i = 1; 2; of
this value before the auction starts, which is known only to himself. In particular, we assume that
each bidders valuation takes the form Vi = V = v (x1; x2) = x1+x2; 8i. This particular functional
4
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form (called the Wallet Game) has been used by Klemperer (1998), and because it is so simple to
work with, it provides valuable and intuitive insights into other valuation functions.
The signals are assumed to be a¢ liated and to have a joint density function f (x1; x2) that
is symmetric and continuous. A¢ liation roughly means that the two signals are nonnegatively
correlated. Milgrom and Weber show that in this particular case a¢ liation requires only that
gXj jXi (xj jxi) satises the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP), where gXj jXi (xj jxi) is
the conditional density of Xj given Xi. This implies that for all x0j > xj ; and x
0
i > xi :
gXj jXi

xj
xi
gXj jXi

xj
x0i 
gXj jXi

x0j
xi
gXj jXi

x0j
x0i : (1)
2.2 Equilibria (symmetric and asymmetric)
Milgrom and Weber show that there exists a symmetric equilibrium of the English auction in
which each bidder is strategy, S (xi) ; is to remain active until the posted price reaches S (xi) =
v (xi; xi) = 2xi (see also Klemperer). This symmetric equilibrium is unique (Levin and Harstad
(1986). However, Milgrom has shown the existence of a continuum of asymmetric equilibria. Let
h (:) be an increasing and surjective function8. Then, the following strategies are equilibrium bid
functions of this model:
S1 (x) = v (x; h (x)) = x+ h (x)
S2 (x) = v
 
h 1 (x) ; x

= h 1 (x) + x: (2)
Each function h (:) will lead to a di¤erent asymmetric equilibrium, and hence there exists a
continuum of asymmetric equilibria. In particular, one can see how each asymmetric equilibrium
departs from the symmetric equilibrium. If h (x) > x; 8x; then bidder 1 will be playing an aggressive
asymmetric strategy, S1 (x) ; because S1 (x) > S (x) : Given this, bidder 2 will then play a passive
asymmetric strategy, S2 (x) because S2 (x) = v
 
h 1 (x) ; x

< S (x) : 9 ;10
2.3 Denition of irrationality
Suppose bidder 2 is playing his symmetric equilibrium strategy and remains active in the auction
until the price reaches S (x2) = v (x2; x2) = 2x2. Let p denote the current price. Knowing that
8A function is surjective if its target coincides with its range.
9Note that if h (x) > x; 8x; this implies that x > h 1 (x) ; 8x:
10For more details on asymmetric equilibria, see Milgrom (1981), Bikhchandani and Riley (1991) or Klemperer
(1998).
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bidder 2 is playing the symmetric equilibrium strategy gives bidder 1 the following information: at
any price p; he knows that S (X2)  p; or X2  S 1 (p) = p=2: In the symmetric equilibrium, this
additional information released during the auction has no value and both bidders ignore it; given
that bidder 2 is bidding up to S (x2) ; bidder 1s best reply is to bid up to S (x1) : If x1 < x2; bidder
1 drops out at p = S (x1) and loses the auction. Even though he knows that the good is worth
more than p = S (x1) but less than S (X2) ; this brings him no advantage in subsequent bidding.
Given bidder 2s strategy, S (x2) ; winning the auction is only possible if he deviates from S (x1)
and continues bidding. However, winning in such circumstances would yield a negative payo¤:
v (x1; x2)  S (x2) = x1 + x2   2x2 < 0:
The concept of irrationalityused in this paper is based on this information released throughout
the auction. First, we assume that an irrationalbidder attempts to estimate his opponents signal
given all the information available to him in the auction: his own signal and the current price. This
estimate is used to inform his strategy. Second, we assume that in doing so he presumes his
opponent is playing the symmetric equilibrium strategy. Such an irrational bidder is e¤ectively
trying to outsmart his opponent by estimating his signal and thus obtaining a more accurate
estimate of the goods true value. However, in doing so he does not anticipate that his opponents
best reply may no longer be the symmetric equilibrium strategy that formed the basis of his
estimate.
The bidding strategy chosen by such an irrational bidderwould be computed in the following
way. Bidder 1 knows that at any price p; with both bidders still active, S (X2)  p or, equivalently,
X2  S 1 (p) = p=2: At this price, bidder 1 updates his expectation of bidder 2s signal, assuming
he is playing the symmetric equilibrium strategy, S (X2). Let 2 (p; x1) be the expectation by
bidder 1 of bidder 2s signal, given that bidder 2 is active at a price of p and given bidder 1s own
signal:
2 (p; x1) = E

X2jX2  S 1 (p) ; X1 = x1

=
Z x
p=2
x2:gX2jX1 (x2jx1) dx1Z x
p=2
gX2jX1 (x2jx1) dx1
; (3)
where 2 (p; x1) is nondecreasing in both arguments
11. Let SA (x1; p) = x1+2 (p; x1) be bidder
1s asymmetric and irrational strategy. The irrational strategy is a function of the posted price, p:
112 (p; x1) is obviously nondecreasing in p: Milgrom and Weber show that for a¢ liated variables, 2 (p; x1) is also
nondecreasing in x1 (Theorem 5).
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When bidders decide which strategies to play (before the auction starts), p is not known. Hence,
given x1; there exists a price level p = p such that
p = x1 + 2 (p
; x1) : (4)
Let SA (x1) = p be bidder 1s asymmetric strategy, which is now only a function of x1. The
above equation is equivalent to
SA (x1) = x1 + 2 (SA (x1) ; x1) (5)
where
2 (SA (x1) ; x1) = E

X2jX2  SA (x1)
2
; X1 = x1

: (6)
Note how this strategy is constructed. Firstly, bidder 1 makes use of the additional information
released during the auction, that is, he Bayesian updates his estimate of X2 (his opponents signal)
by inverting the current price, p (he irrationally assumes that his opponent always plays the sym-
metric equilibrium strategy). Then, he (irrationally) uses this information to compute his bidding
strategy. However, this strategy must be decided before the auction starts (at a time when p is not
available). Hence, he calculates the price p at which his strategy would no longer be consistent with
his irrational behaviour: the point at which his expectation of the value of the good conditional
on all the information available is equal to the price he would pay if he happened to win at that
particular point. At a price p lower than p; x1 + 2 (p; x1) > p; which implies that at a price p,
bidder 1 expects a positive payo¤ if he wins the auction. The highest price at which his expected
payo¤ is not negative is p:
It is important to stress the departures from a model with fully rational bidders incorporated in
our analysis. Rationally, this bidder should not use the Bayesian estimate of his opponents signal
in his bidding strategy, which is irrelevant at the symmetric equilibrium. We assume that this
bidder believes this information to be relevant. This is our rst departure from rationality. Second,
in computing this estimate, bidder 1 assumes his opponent is playing the symmetric equilibrium
strategy: In reality, if bidder 1 deviates from his symmetric equilibrium strategy, bidder 2s best
response is also to deviate. By making this assumption, the Bayesian estimate of bidder 2s signal
is always given by equation (3), even when bidder 2 is playing some other strategy. This is the
second departure from the rational model.
An irrationalbidder makes two mistakes. First, he is trying to outsmart his opponent, but in
doing so he is asking himself the wrong question. Instead of asking himself What is the value of
7
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the good conditional on my winning the auction?(which would lead to the symmetric equilibrium
outcome), he is asking What is the value of the good conditional on my opponent being active at
a given price p?. Second, asking the latter question, he is erroneously inferring the value of the
good by assuming his opponent never deviates from the symmetric equilibrium.
We can show that this irrationalstrategy is always aggressive (i.e. SA (x1)  S (x1) ; 8x1).
Proposition 1 For any probability distribution over [0; x] ; SA (:)  S (:) (i.e. the irrational
bidders strategy is at least as aggressive as the symmetric equilibrium strategy).
Proof. SA (:) = p is obtained from equation (4). Let p = x1; where   0: To prove this
proposition, we need to show that SA (:) = p  S (:) = 2x1: Hence, we have to show that any
p = x1 with  2 [0; 2) cannot satisfy equation (4).
Under the assumptions outlined above, note that 2 (p; x1)  p=2 for any p: Under the (con-
servative) assumption that 2 (p; x1) = p=2
12, when  2 [0; 2) ; equation (4) does not hold with
equality:
p < x1 + p=2
x1 < x1 + x1=2
x1 < 2x1: (7)
Hence, under our most conservative assumption, the lowest  that satises equation (4) is  = 2:
This implies that SA (:) = p  S (:) = 2x1 (i.e. the asymmetric strategy used by an irrational
bidder is at least as aggressive as the symmetric strategy).
If the irrational bidders strategy, SA (:) ; is aggressive (Proposition 1), then following Milgrom
(1981) and Bikhchandani and Riley (1991), we can show that
Proposition 2 (Milgrom) The best response to SA (:)  S (:) is Sa (:)  S (:) :
Proof. From Section 2.2 and the seminal result by Milgrom, we know that SA (x) = v (x; h (x)) 
v (x; x) = S (x) if and only if h (x)  x; 8x: The best response to SA (x) is Sa (x) = v
 
x; h 1 (x)

:
Hence, if h (x)  x; x  h 1 (x), and the best response is always less aggressive than the symmetric
strategy: Sa (x)  S (x) :
From Proposition 1, we know that the particular asymmetric strategy to be played by an
irrational bidder 1 is always aggressive (i.e. SA (:)  S (:) ; 8x). This implies that h (x1) =
12 If 2 (p; x1) > p=2; our result is strenghtened.
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2 (x1)  x1; 8x1: Consequently, the best response to SA (:)  S (:) by bidder 2 is a passive
strategy, Sa (:)  S (:) : This implies that x2  h 1 (x2) =  12 (x2) :
Given that the aggressive strategy takes the form SA (x1) = x1 + 2 (x1) ; the passive strategy
will be Sa (x2) = x2+ 12 (x2) ; where 
 1
2 (:) is the inverse function of 2 (:) ; given in equation (6).
Thus, under the model assumptions, an irrationalbidder will always bid at least as aggressively
as in the symmetric equilibrium and his opponent more passively. Hence, irrationality is an
implicit and credible threat of aggressive bidding, as shown in Propositions 1 and 2.
3 Asymmetric equilibrium with one irrationalbidder
Let "i be the probability that bidder i chooses the aggressive bidding strategy associated with
irrationality or, alternatively, the probability that bidder i is irrational. Conversely, (1  "i) is
the probability that bidder i is rational. Assuming that only one bidder can be irrational, say
bidder 1, would he choose "1 > 0? We can show that when "2 = 0 (bidder 2 is rational), bidder 1
plays the aggressive strategy with probability 1 (i.e. "1 = 1) for probability distributions that lead
to a su¢ ciently asymmetric pair of strategies. Dene
C = E

2Y2    12 (Y1)   12 (Y2)

(8)
where Y1 = max [X1; X2] is the rst order statistic and Y2 = min [X1; X2] is the second order
statistic.
Proposition 3 When "2 = 0, bidder 1 plays SA (:) with probability "1 = 1 for probability distribu-
tions such that C > 0: Otherwise, bidder 1 plays SA (:) with probability "1 = 0:
Proof. Suppose x1 > x2. If bidder 1 plays "1 = 0 (the symmetric equilibrium), he wins and
makes a prot in equilibrium:
U11f"1=0; x1>x2g = x1 + x2   S (x2)
= x1   x2: (9)
If he plays "1 = 1, he wins and his payo¤ is
U11f"1=1; x1>x2g = x1 + x2   Sa (x2)
= x1    12 (x2)
 x1   x2: (10)
9
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Note that because his signal is the highest, he wins in both cases and receives a higher payo¤
when he plays aggressively because his opponent drops out at a lower price, Sa (x2)  S (x2) :
If, on the other hand, x1 < x2; and bidder 1 plays "1 = 0; he loses and receives a 0 payo¤, but if
he plays "1 = 1; he may win the auction because of his aggressive strategy. Conditional on winning
(i.e. conditional on SA (x1) > Sa (x2)), his payo¤ is
U11f"1=1; x1<x2; SA(x1)>Sa(x2)g = x1 + x2   Sa (x2)
= x1    12 (x2) (11)
which may be higher or lower than 0.13. Ex ante, before knowing the signal and using the
symmetric distribution of the signals, his expected payo¤ from playing the symmetric equilibrium
is
E

U11f"1=0g

=
1
2
E [X1  X2jX1 > X2]
=
1
2
E [Y1   Y2] : (12)
Ex ante, bidder 1 faces a 1=2 probability of holding the highest signal (the signal distribution is
symmetric, thus Pr [X1 = max (X1; X2)] = 1=2) and winning the auction at the symmetric equilib-
rium. With probability Pr [X1 = min (X1; X2)] = 1=2, he holds the lowest signal and loses at the
symmetric equilibrium, leaving him with a prot of 0:
His expected payo¤ from playing aggressively14 is
E

U11f"1=1g

=
1
2
E

X1    12 (X2)
X1 > X2+ 1
2
E

X1    12 (X2)
X1 < X2
=
1
2
E

Y1    12 (Y2)

+
1
2
E

Y2    12 (Y1)

: (13)
Hence, bidder 1s best strategy is to play aggressively (SA (x1)) with probability "1 = 1 if
E

U11f"1=1g

> E

U11f"1=0g

: (14)
From equations (12) and (13), this inequality is satised for probability distributions such that
C = E

2Y2    12 (Y1)   12 (Y2)

> 0: (15)
13 If Sa (x2) is not very asymmetric, then it will be close to S (x2) ; and hence  12 (x2) would be close to x2; in this
case, the payo¤ could be negative.
14This follows from Proposition 2.
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Such distributions generate a su¢ ciently asymmetric pair of strategies. For probability distri-
bution that do not satisfy this inequality, bidder 1 plays aggressively with probability "1 = 0 and
we obtain the symmetric equilibrium of Milgrom and Weber.
In this setup, is the auctioneer better o¤ than at the symmetric equilibrium? The expected
auction price in the symmetric equilibrium is equal to the expectation of the second highest bidders
strategy:
E

P1f"1="2=0g

= E [S (Xi)jXi < Xj ]
= E [S (Y2)]
= 2E [Y2] ; (16)
but for probability distributions such that bidder 1 plays "1 = 1 and the equilibrium strategies
are (SA (x1) ; Sa (x2)), the expected price depends on who holds the highest signal. With probability
1=2 bidder 1 holds the highest signal and wins the auction. In this case, the expected price is equal
to the expectation of bidder 2s equilibrium strategy:
E

P1f"1=1; "2=0g

= E [Sa (X2)jX1 > X2]
= E

X2 + 
 1
2 (X2)
X1 > X2
= E

Y2 + 
 1
2 (Y2)

; (17)
but with probability 1=2 bidder 2 holds the highest signal and the expected price is equal to
the expectation of the lowest bidding strategy (drop out price):
E

P1f"1=1; "2=0g

= min [E [SA (X1)jX1 < X2] ; E [Sa (X2)jX1 < X2]] : (18)
As we will show later (section 4.1), ex ante the bidder playing Sa (:) always expects to lose the
auction15. Hence, the above equation becomes
E

P1f"1=1; "2=0g

= min [E [SA (Y2)] ; E [Sa (Y1)]]
= E [Sa (Y1)]
= E

Y1 + 
 1
2 (Y1)

: (19)
15Because the auctioneer has the same information as the bidders before the auction starts (i.e. knowledge of the
signal distribution), he also expects this bidder to lose.
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Given these two expressions (equations (17) and (19)), it is ambiguous whether the auc-
tioneer expects a higher price than in the symmetric equilibrium. In the rst case, 2E [Y2] 
E

Y2 + 
 1
2 (Y2)

; which means that with probability 1=2 the auctioneer would (weakly) prefer the
symmetric equilibrium. However, 2E [Y2] could be higher or lower than E

Y1 + 
 1
2 (Y1)

; which
makes the auctioneers preference generally dependent on the particular distribution we assume.
Although this is generally true, the following result holds:
Proposition 4 When the variables X1 and X2 are highly a¢ liated, the expected price in the sym-
metric equilibrium is unambiguously higher than the expected price in the asymmetric equilibrium
with one irrational bidder, and the auctioneer is clearly worse o¤.
Proof. When X1 and X2 are highly a¢ liated, the joint density f (x1; x2) assigns very high
probabilities to realisations of X1 and X2, which are close to one another. Hence, with highly
a¢ liated variables, the di¤erence between the rst order statistic and the second approaches 0 :
(E [Y1]  E [Y2]) ' 0: (20)
For such a¢ liated distributions, bidder 1 always plays "1 = 1 because equation (15) is satised:
C = E

2Y2    12 (Y2)   12 (Y2)

> 0: In the symmetric equilibrium, the expected price for
the auctioneer becomes E

P1f"1="2=0g

= E [S (Y2)] ' E [S (Y1)] ' 2E [Y1] : In the asymmetric
equilibrium, with probability 1=2 bidder 1 holds the highest signal. The expected price is
E

P1f"1=1; "2=0g

= E

Y2 + 
 1
2 (Y2)

' E Y1 +  12 (Y1) : (21)
With probability 1=2 bidder 2 holds the highest signal. The expected price is
E

P1f"1=1; "2=0g

= E

Y1 + 
 1
2 (Y1)

: (22)
Now note that the expected price in the symmetric equilibrium is at least as high as in the
asymmetric equilibrium
E

P1f"1="2=0g
 ' 2E [Y1]  E P1f"1=1; "2=0g ' E Y1 +  12 (Y1) (23)
because E [Y1]  E

 12 (Y1)

; and the auctioneer weakly prefers the former.
This result is not a general one and is specic to distributions that result in high a¢ liation
between the random variables. The intuition for this result is that in this case the bidder who
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sets the price becomes su¢ ciently less aggressive relative to the symmetric equilibrium, and this
unambiguously reduces sellers revenue16.
4 Equilibrium with two irrationalbidders
It is perhaps more interesting to analyse a setup where both bidders are allowed to play aggressive
strategies. Hence, we now allow both bidders to play "i  0: Notice that if bidder 1 chooses to bid
aggressively (by playing "1  0) and his opponents reply is also to bid aggressively with positive
probability ("2  0); whoever wins the auction may end up paying a higher price than at the
symmetric Nash equilibrium:17
4.1 The auction game
The game is symmetric, so we can focus on bidder 1s strategy choice. In the auction game, bidder
1 can bid aggressively (A) or not aggressively (NA). His payo¤ depends on what bidder 2 does. If
bidder 1 plays NA ("1 = 0) and 2 plays NA ("2 = 0) as well, the payo¤s are those of the symmetric
equilibrium. If bidder 1 plays NA but his opponent plays A, then we have the setup of section 3:
Finally, both bidders may play A, that is, bidder 1 plays SA (x1) and bidder 2 plays SA (x2) :
Before we present the payo¤matrix, note that if x1 > x2; SA (x1) > SA (x2) ; which implies that
when both bidders play aggressively, the bidder holding the highest signal always wins, although
the price may be di¤erent from that in the symmetric equilibrium. To prove this, remember that
SA (x1) = x1 + 2 (x1) and SA (x2) = 1 (x2) + x2: A¢ liation implies that i (:) is increasing in
its argument18, and hence if x1 > x2; this implies 2 (x1) > 1 (x2) ; which in turn implies that
SA (x1) > SA (x2) :
Bidder 1 will win at the symmetric equilibrium if x1 > x2; which happens with probability 1=2:
In this case, and conditional on winning the auction, the payo¤matrix for bidder 1 is given in Table
1. However, also with probability 1=2; bidder 1 loses at the symmetric equilibrium (x1 < x2), in
which case the payo¤ matrix is given by Table 2.
If bidder 1 plays NA and bidder 2 plays A, bidder 1s payo¤depends on which is biggest: Sa (x1)
or SA (x2) : Before receiving the signals,
E [Sa (X1)] = E

X1 + 
 1
2 (X1)

 E [SA (X2)] = E [SA (X1)] = E [X1 + 2 (X1)] ; (24)
16 I thank an anonymous referee for this observation.
17When both bidders are irrational, both bid aggressively and both assume their opponents are playing the
symmetric equilibrium strategies. This leads to higher expected prices in the auction.
18See Theorem 5 in Milgrom and Weber.
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Bidder 2
NA A
Bidder 1 NA x1   x2

x1   1 (x2) ; if Sa (x1) > SA (x2)
0; if Sa (x1) < SA (x2)
A x1    12 (x2) x1   1 (x2)
Table 1: Bidder 1s payo¤ matrix when x1 > x2
Bidder 2
NA A
Bidder 1 NA 0 0
A x1    12 (x2) 0
Table 2: Bidder 1s payo¤ matrix when x1 < x2
which means that bidder 1 never expects to win when he plays NA and bidder 2 plays A. The
ex ante payo¤ of playing NA when bidder 2 is also playing NA is given by equation (12) and the
ex ante payo¤ of playing A when bidder 2 is playing NA is given by equation (13). Finally, the ex
ante payo¤ of playing A when bidder 2 is also playing A is given by
E

U11f"1="2=1g

=
1
2
E [X1   1 (X2)jX1 > X2]
=
1
2
E [Y1   1 (Y2)] : (25)
We summarize the ex ante payo¤ matrix for bidder 1 in Table 3.
4.2 Equilibria
Let C be dened as in equation (8) and dene
D = E [Y1    (Y2)] : (26)
Using the ex ante expected payo¤s (see Table 3), we can show that:
Proposition 5 For probability distribution such that C > 0, and D > 0, the dominant strategy
equilibrium of the game is for both bidders to play A with probability "i = 1; if C < 0, and D < 0,
the dominant strategy equilibrium is for both bidders to play NA with probability (1  "i ) = 1:
Bidder 2
NA A
Bidder 1 NA 12E [Y1   Y2] 0
A 12E

Y1 + Y2    12 (Y1)   12 (Y2)

1
2E [Y1   1 (Y2)]
Table 3: Bidder 1s ex ante payo¤ matrix
14
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For probability distributions such that only C > 0 is satised (thus D < 0); there are two
pure-strategy Nash equilibria (bidder i plays A and bidder j plays NA) and one (symmetric) mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium, where " = CC D :
For probability distributions such that only D > 0 is satised (thus C < 0), there are two pure-
strategy Nash equilibria (bidder 1 and bidder 2 both play NA or both play A), and one (symmetric)
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, where " is given by the expression above.
Proof. The signal distribution is symmetric, which implies that E

 12 (:)

= E

 11 (:)

=
E

 1 (:)

: From Proposition 3, we know that for distributions such that C > 0, bidder 1 strictly
prefers to play A. Looking at Table 3, it is easily checked that if D > 0; the dominant strategy
equilibrium for both bidders is to play A. Conversely, if those inequalities are reversed, then the
dominant strategy equilibrium is to play NA.
If C > 0 is satised, but D < 0; inspection of Table 3 will show that when bidder 1 plays A,
bidder 2s best reply is to play NA, and bidder 1s best reply to bidder 2s strategy (NA) is also
to play A. Therefore, this pair of strategies is a Nash equilibrium (symmetry tells us that bidder 1
playing NA and bidder 2 playing A is also a Nash equilibrium).
In order to obtain the (symmetric) mixed strategy equilibrium, we have to nd the value of "1
that maximises his ex ante payo¤ in Table 3. Hence, bidder 1 must solve
max
"1
E [U1] = (1  "1) (1  "2) 1
2
E [Y1   Y2] + "1 (1  "2) 1
2
E

Y1 + Y2    1 (Y1)   1 (Y2)

+
+ "1"2
1
2
E [Y1    (Y2)] : (27)
The rst order condition is
@E [U1]
@"1
=   (1  "2)E [Y1   Y2]+(1  "2) 1
2
E

Y1 + Y2    1 (Y1)   1 (Y2)

+"2
1
2
E [Y1    (Y2)] ;
(28)
which is set equal to zero and rearranged to yield
"2 = E

2Y2    1 (Y1)   1 (Y2)
2Y2    1 (Y1)   1 (Y2)  Y1 +  (Y2)

=
C
C  D: (29)
Bidder 1 will be indi¤erent between playing A or NA when bidder 2 plays "2: The problem for
bidder 2 is similar, and using the symmetry of the signal distribution, we conclude that a mixed
strategy equilibrium exists such that "1 = "2 = ": It is easily checked that " < 1:
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Finally, for probability distributions such that D > 0 but C < 0; inspection of Table 3 will
show that having both bidders playing A or NA are Nash equilibria of the auction game. For such
distributions, the (symmetric) mixed strategy of equation (29) is also a Nash equilibrium. In such
an equilibrium, 0 < " < 1:
Depending on the signal distribution, the auction game may or may not have more than one
Nash equilibrium. Unlike the simplied scenario of section 3, this raises the question of which
equilibrium might realistically be played. Without further assumptions, it is not possible to predict
which equilibrium would be more likely to be played. Allowing both bidders to play the irrational
and aggressive strategy clearly enlarges the set of possible equilibria in the auction game.
It is worth pointing out that this equilibrium (as the equilibrium of Proposition 3, when only
one bidder is irrational) is based on ex ante expected prots (i.e. before the signal realisations
become known to bidders). Whilst this may look like an inappropriate approach, we believe it is
not19. If expected prots are calculated after the signals arrive, this would only a¤ect the results
in so far as the expected value of an opponents signal (or any function of that signal) would have
to be calculated using the density of Xj conditional on the observed value of xi; and not the prior
distribution (both bidders know their own signal as well as the signal distribution, but they do
not know who holds the highest signal). Di¤erent results could well be obtained in such a setup,
but if the auctions are repeated, bidders are likely to become increasingly reliant on their prior
distribution and not the particular signal realisation of a particular auction: they know that signals
will sometimes be high but sometimes be low. If a pattern of behaviour (rational or irrational)
is to emerge from such repeated auctions, then it is likely that that pattern is based on the prior
distribution, not the conditional distribution.
4.3 Expected price for the auctioneer
When two irrationalbidders play aggressively with probability "i; we will show that the auctioneer
is better o¤ than at the symmetric equilibrium provided bidders matchtheir strategies (i.e. both
play A with the same probability "), and this result holds for any probability distribution. From
Proposition 5, the only equilibrium obtained that does not imply matching strategies is the
equilibrium in which bidder i plays A and bidder j plays NA. In that case, we are back to the
ambiguous result of section 3.
There are three possible cases of matching strategies. Firstly, when both bidders play the
symmetric equilibrium (both play NA with probability (1  ")), the expected price is E [P ] =
2E [Y2] (see equation (16)). Secondly, when both bidders play aggressively (both play A with
19This objection was raised by an anonymous referee.
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probability "), the expected price is
E [P ] = E [Xi +  (Xi)jXj > Xi]
= E [Y2 +  (Y2)] : (30)
Thirdly, when one bidder plays A and his opponent plays NA (with probability " (1  ")), the
auctioneer expects the bidder playing Sa (:) to lose the auction, whether he holds the highest signal
or not (see equation (24)). In this case, the expected price is
E [P ] =
1
2
E

Y1 + 
 1 (Y1)

+
1
2
E

Y2 + 
 1 (Y2)

: (31)
Hence, for the matching strategies equilibria, the expected price for the auctioneer is given by
E [P (")] = (1  ")2 2E [Y2] + 2" (1  ")

1
2
E

Y1 + 
 1 (Y1)

+
1
2
E

Y2 + 
 1 (Y2)

+
+"2E [Y2 +  (Y2)] ; (32)
which can be simplied to
E [P (")] = 2E [Y2] +
 
E

Y1 + 
 1 (Y1) +  1 (Y2)  3Y2

"+
+
 
E

2Y2 +  (Y2)  Y1    1 (Y1)   1 (Y2)

"2: (33)
Proposition 6 For any probability distribution, the expected price with two irrationalbidders is
always at least as high as the expected price at the symmetric equilibrium provided bidders match
their strategies.
Proof. We need to show that for any equilibrium value of " (i.e. for any value of " which
results in a Nash equilibrium, with both bidders matching their strategies), the expression of
equation (33) is always at least as high as the expression of equation (16).
Take the equilibrium value of " in the mixed strategy equilibrium (equation (29)), and the
denitions of C and D from equations (8) and (26) respectively. The expression in equation (33)
becomes:
E [P (")] = 2E [Y2] + (E [Y1   Y2   C]) "+ (C  D) "2; (34)
which after substituting " = CC D becomes
17
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E [P (")] = 2E [Y2] + (E [Y1   Y2]) C
C  D
= 2E [Y2] + (E [Y1   Y2]) ": (35)
This implies that in the mixed strategy equilibrium, the expected price for the auctioneer is
always at least as high as at the symmetric equilibrium because 0 < " < 1 (Proposition 5) and
E [Y1   Y2]  0 by the denition of the order statistics.
If both bidders play NA (" = 0), the symmetric equilibrium strategies are played and the
expected price is given by equation (16).
If both bidders play A (" = 1), then the expected price is given by equation (30), which is at
least as high as that obtained at the symmetric equilibrium (see Proposition 1).
The expanded auction game, which allows both bidders to compute their bidding strategies
irrationallyand play them with positive probability may have m ltiple Nash equilibria, depending
on the probability distribution of the signals. One of those Nash equilibria is the pure strategy
asymmetric equilibrium where one bidder plays A and his opponent plays NA (see section 3).
Without further assumptions, it is not possible to predict how likely it is for this equilibrium to be
played. However, it appears implausible that symmetric bidders would end up in this equilibrium
of the expanded auction game. As Bikhchandani and Riley argue, it is more natural to expect
symmetric bidders to bid symmetrically.
5 Conclusion
Looking at experimental evidence of English auctions20, we have noticed a behavioral pattern: not
only is the Nash equilibrium bid function apparently not used by subjects, but the bid function
with more predictive power is not a Nash equilibrium. Levin et al. point out that the Nash bidding
function may not be as intuitive as economists believe, and therefore other (more intuitive) bidding
rules could emerge naturally in experiments. Avery and Kagel expected more experienced bidders
to learn from their mistakes (and from the winners curse) and hence to converge towards Nash
bidding as the experiment approached the end. They found very weak support for this claim. The
naturalrules that emerge in experiments seem to be fairly robust over time.
In this paper, we have proposed an extension to Milgrom and Webers model that attempts to
explain these ndings. We have analysed the e¤ects of introducing a particular type of irrationality
in the English auction model. We assume an irrational bidder updates the estimate of his opponents
signal as the auction price increases. Moreover, we assume such a bidder believes his opponent is
20Levin et al. (1996), Avery and Kagel (1997) and Gonçalves and Hey (2006).
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playing the symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy (i.e. he does not consider that his opponents
strategy may no longer be a best reply). This irrationality assumption (i) contributes towards
explaining overbidding and the winners curse in experimental auctions and (ii) provides testable
predictions for further experiments.
We rst looked at the possibility of having only one bidder behaving irrationally, and second,
and more interestingly, of having both bidders behaving irrationally. In both cases, bidders choose
to behave irrationally with positive probability. In this latter case, there may exist multiple Nash
equilibria of the auction game. Nevertheless, we have shown that the expected price for the auc-
tioneer is higher than at Milgrom and Webers symmetric equilibrium provided bidders match
their strategies, which appears to be a plausible assumption given the symmetry of bidders. In
these equilibria, neither bidder expects to lose money, although ex post they may realise that they
did.
We believe our conclusions have some empirical support. A large percentage (almost 30% in
Avery and Kagel and 19% in Gonçalves and Hey) of experimental auctions result in negative prots
for the winner. Additionally, nal auction prices in Gonçalves and Hey are some 22% higher than
predicted by the symmetric Nash equilibrium; in Avery and Kagel, nal prices were 16% higher
than predicted. Conversations with subjects in Gonçalves and Hey show that bidders understood
perfectly that they would only receive money by winning auctions, and this may have triggered
aggressive bidding and the winners curse in a substantial proportion of cases.
Eyster and Rabins application of the concept of cursed equilibriumto common value auctions,
allowing bidders to believe with positive probability that they are playing against irrational bidders,
is also an attempt to explain Avery and Kagels results. They suggest that bidders in those auctions
were indeed cursed with very high probability (probability 1 and 0.75 for inexperienced and
experienced bidders respectively). This result is not totally satisfactory: under Eyster and Rabins
setup, any outcome (including the symmetric Nash equilibrium) could be justied21. By contrast,
our model allows for experimental testing by predicting that bidders may, with some probability,
play an aggressive strategy, depending on the signal distribution. Therefore, under our setup, it
is possible to choose two or three signal distributions (say, uniform or normal) and calculate the
respective aggressive (irrational) strategies that bidders would use if they behaved as we predict,
as well as the probabilities that they would do so. In e¤ect, our model predicts a particular value
of  (how cursed bidders are) for each signal distribution, and the validity of this prediction can
21 In fact, Eyster and Rabins conclusions are similar to Avery and Kagels, suggesting that bidders used the prior
distribution of signals to aid the estimation of the common value instead of playing the symmetric Nash equilibrium
strategy. The latter dene this to be expected value bidding (which is not a Nash equilibrium), whereas the former
demonstrates that this could be an -cursed Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.
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be experimentally tested against the symmetric Nash equilibrium and non-equilibrium statistical
bidding rules. This is the next natural step of the approach suggested in this paper.
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